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Competition Policy In Developing

Economies: The Case Of Brazil

Gesner Oliveira* & Thomas Fujiwara
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this article is to discuss the implementation of
competition policy in Brazil through a historical perspective. In contrast
with the experience of various OECD countries, including the United States
in particular, competition policy in Brazil has only recently become
relevant. However, its increasing prevalence has not been preceded by the
development of a competition culture and institutions. This fact has several
implications for policy making. Best practices in the OECD countries
cannot be automatically imported without due attention to the peculiarities
of a developing economy.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section II describes the
different phases of competition policy in Brazil. Section III underlines the
structural transformations of the economy as well as the international
circumstances that made competition policy relevant. Section IV discusses
the challenges and peculiarities of implementing competition policy in a
developing economy. Section V describes how Brazil has coped with such
challenges. Section VI contains the major conclusions.
II. THE PHASES OF THE BRAZILIAN COMPETITION POLICY'S
DEVELOPMENT
The role and characteristics of competition policy vary according to
the stage of development of a particular country. In the case of Brazil,
competition policy has only become relevant starting in the late twentieth
century in the context of a more open market economy.
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One can identify three phases of competition policy in Brazil, as
indicated in Chart 1. The division is, of course, arbitrary. Indeed, the
evolution towards modem competition policy shows interesting nuances. A
few competition cases occurred even when the policy regime was
characterized by strong state intervention. The marks and vices of
interventionism remained even when a more modem competition law was
already in place.
CHART 1: THE THREE PHASES OF COMPETITION POLICY IN
BRAZIL'
Dae
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The first phase extends from the enactment of the 1937 Constitution
under Getflio Vargas' dictatorship to the 1988 Constitution, when the first
measures towards a more open economy were taken. This phase is
characterized by a high degree of state intervention in the economy and
only a marginal role for competition policy. Indeed, during import

substitution, in which the state had a crucial role in production and direct
intervention in the markets, antitrust was not important at all.
During this first phase, there was no established competition
legislation in the country. Instead of protecting the market, several
initiatives were aimed at providing instruments for the Brazilian state to
intervene. Market protection in reality meant the legal possibility of state
intervention.
Note that despite the difficulties of implementing competition polic 'in
this phase, a more modem competition law was enacted in 1962. A
national competition authority-the Conselho Administrativo de Defesa

Econ6mica ("CADE")-was formed that same year.3 The number of cases
2 Lei No. 4.137, de 10 de setembro de 1962, D.O.U. de 12.11.1962: 11717, col. 1.
(Brazil).

3 Id.
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considered by CADE in the following three decades was relatively small, as
shown later in Section V. However, even this limited activity created the
rise of certain professional circles dedicated to antitrust in a few major cities
in Brazil.4 Nevertheless, CADE was not involved in policy making. The
state sector continued its dominance and most markets were under some
kind of direct or indirect control by the government.
The second phase started in the late 1980's. The 1988 Constitution
recognized the central role of the private sector and the first measures of
trade liberalization were undertaken. 5 However, many sectors of the
economy were still under direct control of the government and prices were
not totally liberalized.6 That is why this phase marked a transition period.
The second phase opened up a transition stage characterized by a change in
direction to a new model of development with greater exposure of the
country to the world economy and less state intervention in the domestic
economy, in contrast to an industrialization by import substitution regime.7
This process of structural change provoked several transformations and
made the previously existing price controls obsolete. 8
Another feature of this phase was the continued macroeconomic crisis
represented by hyperinflation. For an indexed economy like Brazil to
achieve stability, a specific strategy for coordination of economic agents
was necessary to achieve a change from an extremely high rate of inflation
to a single-digit annual rate. This implied that some kind of coordination
mechanism was necessary to go with the new policy regime.
In turn, this explains why it took some time to eliminate the price
control bodies. Indeed, the government created a secretariat linked to the
Central Administration (The National Economic Law Secretariat,with the
local acronym "SNDE") in 1990 and also resisted an immediate extinction
of the price monitoring agencies. 9 Usually this resistance to eliminate old
bureaucratic functions is attributed exclusively to lobbying and political
resistance on the part of the bureaucracy, which in fact occurred. However,
4 A few scholars and professionals became active in Sdo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo
Horizonte and Porto Alegre in the 1970's and 1980's.
5 Between 1988 and 1989, the Brazilian average import tariff dropped from 51% to 34%;
the importing process was also simpliefied, with the reduction of some non-tariff barriers
and the unification of some import taxes. F. GIAMBIAGI & M.M. MOREIRA, A ECONOMIA
BRASILEIRA NOS ANOS 90, 46 (BNDES 1999).
6 See Chart 6 for some examples of sectors under state control in the late eighties.
7 See Gesner Oliveira & Frederico Turolla, Politica economica do Segundo governo
FHC: mudanca em condicoes adversas, in TEMPO SOCIAL REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA DA USP
(2004).
8 GESNER OLIVEIRA, BRASIL REAL: DESAFIOS DA POS-ESTABILIZACAO NA VIRADO DO

MILENIO (1996).
9 Conselho Ministerial

de Pregos was extinguished in 1990, but the popular
Superintenddncia Nacional de Pregos e Abastecimento (SUNAB) existed until 1997.
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in the Brazilian case, there was an additional reason for a gradual phasing
out of the old price control regime.1 0
It became clear that the state would not be able to continue to lead the
investment and production process due to a profound fiscal crisis. A severe
stabilization crisis characterized this period. The Brazilian economy
experienced hyperinflation in 1989-90.
After a series of stabilization
plans,
the
Real
Plan
of
1994
was
created
to deal with the inflationary
• •12
crisis.

The third phase began with the success of the stabilization plan
prepared in 1993-94, the so-called Real Plan. 13 Law No. 8884 of June of
1994 was a landmark in this transformation. Curiously, the political
motivation for the approval of Law No. 8884 of 1994 also drew some
inspiration from the notion of greater state intervention in the markets,
inherited from the previous stages. Indeed, President Itamar Franco hoped
that the law would permit fast punishment of price abuses in the
pharmaceutical sector and conditioned the implementation of the
stabilization plan on the approval of the project which became Law No.
8884.14

The present Law No. 8884 introduced three major changes. First, it
gave more power to a technical body-CADE-which was transformed
into the final instance of decision at the administrative level, i.e., there was
no appeal to the minister or to the President. Second, it gave a greater
degree of autonomy to CADE, which transformed it into an independent
authority and created
a two-year term for its members. Third, it introduced
5
merger control.'
The non-dominant current of legislation can always be detected even
while the other is predominant. Thus, Brazil showed some progress in
competition policy in spite of six decades of pronounced state intervention.
Analogously, the inertia of bureaucracy explains the prolonged survival of
the anachronistic provisions, such as Delegated Law No. 4 of 1962, which
set the rules for price control and was only abandoned in 1997. Chart 2
sums up the historical development of the second current of legislation in
competition policy, including Law No. 8158/91.

10OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing price policy at this phase of the transition)
l "See infra note 17.

12OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at Section II (discussing the implementation of the Real Plan).
13 Id.

14Based on informal reports from different sources in the Brazilian government at the
time of the elaboration of the Real Plan.
15This Article maintained part of the structure of Article 13 of Law No. 8158/91 which,
in turn, originated from Article 74 of Law No. 4137, of 1962.
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CHART 2: EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION IN BRAZIL
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Conduct
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Law No. 8884/94 includes provisions that highlight competition
promotion. The legislature attributed to CADE the role of "instructing the
public on the forms of infringement of the economic order. ' , 16 However, a
careful analysis reveals the need for progress in the way proceedings are
conducted, for improved merger control, for de-bureaucratize proceedings,
and for transparency and celerity in decision-making.
III. STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND STABILIZATION: THE
PRECONDITIONS FOR AN ACTIVE COMPETITION POLICY IN
BRAZIL
As discussed in the previous section, although the Brazilian legislation
on competition dates back to the 1930's, its implementation did not become
relevant until the mid-1990's. Under the import-substitution model, the
Brazilian state intervened in a number of sectors in order to induce
industrialization.17 In addition to the prominent presence of the State, the
model was also characterized by a closed economy producing mainly for
the domestic market. On the basis of this structure, the Brazilian economy
showed high growth rates that were sustained until the mid- 1970's.18
After the oil shock, however, this model presented several limitations
due to the lack of external funds and a fiscal crisis in Brazil. From 1980 to

16 Under Item XVIII of Article 7 of Law No. 8884 of 1994, which constitutes a slight

change to line r of Article 17 of Law No. 4137 of 1962. Lei No. 8.884 de 11 de junho de
1994.
17 See Albert Fishlow, Brazilian development in Long Term Perspective, 70 AMERICAN
EcONOMIc REVIEW 102 (1980).
18From 1940 to 1980, the Brazilian per capita GDP grew at an average rate of 4% per
year (achieving the average rate of 6.1% per year during the seventies). However, in the
1980s this rate fell below 1% per year according to data from the Brazilian Institute for
Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
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1989, the annual growth rate fell to 1%, which was far below the average of
7% sustained during the period of 1970-79.19 By the 1980's inflation had
already soared into the triple digits and in 1989-90 Brazil experienced
hyperinflation. 20 These factors, combined with falling productivity in the
state sector, led to major changes in the policy regime.
Five changes explain the increasing importance of competition policy.
The first change was represented by trade liberalization. This process had
been initiated under Jos6 Samey's government but was accelerated with the
Industrial and Trade Policy ("PICE") during Fernando Collor's mandate
(1990-92). Trade liberalization was a relatively gradual process. Chart 3
shows the decline in the import tariff rate. The Industrial and Trade Policy
eliminated special import regimes and reduced non-tariff barriers. The
Brazilian average import tariff dropped from 57.5% in 1987 to 13.4% in
1998, while the maximum tariff dropped from over 100% to 38.1% in the
same period.2'
22
CHART 3: EVOLUTION OF THE IMPORT TARIFF RATE
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Federal Law No. 8031/9023 enacted the Privatization Program, which

19 Data
from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE),
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/.
20 The average annual inflation rate in the 1980's was 237%, and the inflation rate in

1989 and 1990 was, respectively, 1783% and 1477%. Getilio Vargas Foundation,
http://www.fgv.br/principal/idxprincipal.asp.
21 See H. KUME, G. PIANI, & C.F.B. DE SOUZA, A POLITICA BRASILEIRA DE IMPORTACAO NO
PERIODO 1987-98: DESCRICAO E AVALIACAO (2000).
22 Sim~o Davi Silver, Mudanqas Estruturais na

Economia Brasileira (1988-2002):
Abertura, Estabilizaqioe Crescimento, availableat http://www.usp.br/prolam/simao.pdf;
Trade Profile of Brazil by the World Trade Organization, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/
WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BR.
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began the process of reducing direct state intervention in the Brazilian
economy. Its first phase covered the 1991-94 period and focused on
privatizing state enterprises (steel, petrochemicals, and fertilizers) that did
not require the introduction of specific regulatory frameworks. Receipts
from privatization totaled US $8.6 billion during this period.24
The second privatization phase (1995-98) included the sale of the
state-owned companies most directly involved in infrastructure sectors such
as telecommunications, electricity, and railroads. In all, the program
represented gains of US $86.9 billion of which US $70.3 billion
corresponded to actual revenue from sales.2 5
The third change dealt with regulation, which in turn was a
consequence of the progress of the privatization process. When the
privatization process reached the infrastructure, it became clear that the
state would have to be prepared to regulate private monopolies.
Given the nature of the sectors involved in the second phase of the
privatization program, specific regulatory frameworks were required. Brazil
already had some government agencies with regulatory powers, 26 but they
did not have the same characteristics as the ones created in the second half
of the 1990's as part of the process of transforming the role of the State in
the economic sphere. In this context, competition authorities became
important, as they were needed to complement the work of and to interact
with regulatory agencies. Vertical and horizontal agreements, as well as
cartels in regulated industries, required the participation of the antitrust
bodies.
The fourth change was stabilization. Indeed, when inflation was high
and accelerating after the late 1970's, there was no room for microeconomic
policies. Concerns with deadweight losses seemed superfluous when prices
were growing at more than 20-30% a month.27
Inflation became the main concern after the mid-1980's. A dozen
stabilization plans were implemented from 1986 until the Real Plan in
1994.2S The coordination of inflationary expectations through monetary
reform, the utilization of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, and some
effort to control the fiscal accounts succeeded in lowering the inflation rate.

23 Lei 8.03 1, de 12 de abril de 1990.
24 OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 96.
25
26

See id. at 88.
Such as the Central Bank ("BACEN")-created by Law No. 4595 of December 3 1,

1964, or the Superintendence of Private Insurance ("SUSEP")--created by Law No. 73 of
November 21, 1966-or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("CVM")--created by
Law No. 6385 of December 7,1976.
27 See supra note 20.
28 OLIVEIRA, supra note 8 (contains a list of the Brazilian stabilization plans of the 1980s
and 1990's).
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The average inflation in the period 1995-2005 was 8.17%.29 Most forecasts
indicate a one-digit level for the next few years.30
The fifth change was related to the international environment. Under
different forms, competition policy increased in importance among policy
recommendations. Multilateral organizations started to emphasize
competition policy during the 1980's as one of the conditionality
requirements. Competition was also included as one of the Singapore WTO
Ministerial issues in 1996, and a working group on trade and competition
was created at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 3' This group was

very active until 2001. The creation of the International Competition
Commission ("ICN") in 2001 offered a natural benchmark for developing
countries and a mechanism of soft convergence among the different
national policies.
In conclusion, the Brazilian economy experienced profound changes
after the late 1980's. The economy was opened to international goods and
capital inflows. Direct state intervention in production was replaced by
regulation. Price controls aimed at controlling high inflation were replaced
by competition policy. 32 Such transformations should put competition
policy at the center of public policy concerns. However, obstacles exist that
impede the effective implementation of competition policy. Such obstacles
tend to be more severe in a developing country context, as the following
section shows.
IV. CHALLENGES AND PECULIARITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
COMPETITION POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Certain peculiarities in developing economies require technical
attention when implementing competition law. Speaking in econometric
language, there is no need for a new structural model but the parameters are
significantly different. In general, competition problems in developing
countries are more severe than in developed nations because authorities in
developing countries have fewer resources. We list below six important
peculiarities of competition policy in developing countries.
First, resources cannot be reallocated easily within the economy. Entry
barriers are higher because the infrastructure is precarious, as illustrated in
Chart 4. Few firms can have access to and/or afford the cost of certain port
terminals, railroads services, and other facilities.

29

Getlio Vargas Foundation, http://www.fgv.br/principal/idx_principal.asp.

30 id.

31Information on WTO actions on competition policy can be found at the WTO website,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/compe/compe.htm.
32 OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at Section II.
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CHART 4: PRECARIOUS INFRASTRUCTURE 33
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that

obstruct the realization of its services as
well as new investments

33 Note that the evaluation criteria to determine precarious infra-structure are: regulatory
paradigm, legal matters, taxation, institutional matters and investment level. Source:
REVISTA EXAME. Anziario Exame de Infra-estrututra2005/2006 (2005).
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In addition, higher transaction costs prevent new firms from contesting
quasi-monopolies. Chart 5 shows how transaction costs are relatively high
in Brazil.
34
CHART 5: HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS
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34 Source: World Bank. This data is available
ExploreEconomies/EconomyCharacteristics.aspx.

at http://www.doingbusiness.org/
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Second, although the Brazilian privatization program was one of the
largest in the world in absolute terms, state companies have maintained
dominant positions in various markets.35 Chart 6 informs the degree of
privatization in different sectors.
CHART 6: DEGREE OF PRIVATIZATION IN DIFFERENT SECTORS
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Medium

Low

Petrochemical

Electric

FinancialSystems

Fertilizers

Natural Gas
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Third, as an average-sized economy with a prominent presence of
multinational enterprises, the Brazilian economy has experienced cases of
cross-border mergers and international cartels. This requires cooperation
with other national competition authorities. Another consequence of a
relatively smaller market is the observation of higher concentration ratios
for the majority of relevant markets.
Fourth, the transition towards a more liberalized economy has
implications for efficiency measurements. Competition authorities of
mature economies tend to be skeptical about the magnitude of efficiencies
which can be obtained through mergers. However, in transition economies
with great inefficiencies due to price control and other distortions, certain
transactions may present extremely large efficiency gains. In liberalized
markets, whole sectors may have to be consolidated in order to gain scale
economies which could not be captured under the old policy regime.
Fifth, the large informal sector has important implications. Chart 7
puts the Brazilian informal sector in comparative perspective. The presence
of large informal sectors creates dual markets and may distort the analysis
authorities conduct for the formal markets. Market power of dominant
formal firms may be over-estimated due to an under-estimation of the price
elasticity of demand. The existence of a large informal sector also creates
additional noise in price information, making cartels more unstable and
cartel analysis more difficult. Lastly, some investigations about predatory
pricing may involve reviewing a broader set of policies and in particular
how imperfect enforcement of the legislation may distort competition.

35 State companies still maintain dominant positions in sectors such as postal services,
water and sewage, banking, and oil.

Competition Policy In DevelopingEconomies: The Case Of Brazil
26:619 (2006)

SECTOR IN SELECTED
CHART 7: THE SIZE OF THE INFORMAL
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Sixth, the Olsonian 37 political economy's problems of implementing
competition policy are even more difficult in developing countries.
Relatively new agencies have to fight for a share of the budget to enforce a
law that may reduce the power of entrenched interests. In contrast to trade
policy, no specific groups will benefit from successful antitrust enforcement
and gains will be diffused among millions of consumers. In contrast to
consumer protection, the issues are often distant from the consumers'
experiences. It is a difficult task to "explain" to final consumers how certain
discussions of abuse of market power in intermediary and capital goods will
affect them. Thus, it is not surprising that all political parties have given
little attention to competition policy in the context of pressing social
problems and high degrees of poverty and inequality.
In conclusion, developing countries have more competition problems
and fewer resources then developed countries. The next section illustrates
how such difficulties have been dealt with in the Brazilian case.
V. CHALLENGES AND PECULIARITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
COMPETITION POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: ASPECTS
OF THE BRAZILIAN CASE
In contrast to the majority of the emerging countries, Brazil has had
early experience with competition policy. Since its creation by Law No.
4137 of 1962, CADE has developed a certain jurisprudence.3 8 However, it
only became more active after 1994. The historical evolution of the number
of cases judged by CADE, shown in Chart 8, is illustrative: until the
beginning of the 1990's, the number of cases judged per month was only
37 Mancur Olson's "collective action problem" pointed out that state policies that
generated diffuse benefits for a large group of people would not receive as much funds as
policies generating concentrated benefits for a small group, as in the latter case it is more
difficult for a strong lobby for the policy to occur. See MANCUrR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
38 See E.M.M.Q. FARINA, ANAIS DO XVIII ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE ECONOMIA (1990)

(discussing the Brazilian competition policy before the 1990s).
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slightly more than one, increasing to 55.8 in 2001-03.
JUDGED BY
CHART 8: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASES
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CADE's decisions on mergers and acquisitions, such as the decisions
regarding Colgate-Kolynos in 1996, AmBev in 2000, and Nestl6/Garoto in
2004, gave more visibility to the institution. This fact does not result
necessarily from the authority's decision to prioritize one area of antitrust to
the detriment of others.
The relative importance of the merger cases in the 1990's has to do
with two factors: 1) a sharp increase in the number of cross-border mergers
impacting developing countries' markets and operating as a form of entry of
foreign direct investment; and 2) the time necessary to eliminate the old
stock of conduct cases inherited from the old price control period and
develop new investigative tools against cartels.
The debate over whether control of conduct is more or less important
than merger control has no real content. It is more a question of balance
between the different fronts on which an antitrust agency operates in the
various stages of institutional development.
If the activity of the agency were to be perpetually restricted to
39
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repression of conduct, the non-existence of merger review could lead to the
formation of non-competitive market structures. However, these noncompetitive market structures would increase the frequency of
infringements of the economic order, partially or totally frustrating the
repression of conduct of the authority. On the other hand, to neglect the
repression of conduct is equivalent to abandoning the very reason for
merger control exists, which is to prevent the abuse of economic power.
Indeed, the challenge is to properly balance the work on the two fronts
and to achieve gains in productivity in such a way as to enable both to be
achieved with the limited budget available. The next two subsections
discuss how each of these two areas evolved in Brazil.
A. Control of Conduct: Settling Accounts with the Past, the Prevalence of
the Rule of Reason, and the Recent Anti-Cartel Activity
In the first years of Law No. 8884/94, conduct cases represented the
majority of cases considered by CADE. However, many argue that the
majority of cases were related to proceedings in the past, which were set
aside for lack of detailed information.4 ° Chart 9 shows the procedure used
for consideration of conduct cases.
CHART 9: PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONDUCT
CASES
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However, the fact that the majority of the cases were judged invalid
and set aside represented a necessary step to eliminating uncertainty for the
private sector. As discussed before, the circumstances of Brazilian
industrialization created an environment in which authority took a role in
controlling market variables and in which the so-called "protection of the
popular economy" was prevalent. It was thus natural that, as more rigorous
criteria of antitrust analysis were applied, a large proportion of the

40 It is also argued that the main sources of formation of case law continues to be in
rulings on acts of concentration. This is only partially true. See CADE Annual Report of
1997, http://www.cade.gov.br/.
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proceedings should be dismissed. Indeed, this is positive because it relieves
the private sector of the burden of pending administrative cases that are not
supported by a more modem antitrust legislation.
In spite of the slim chances of a sentence, these pending matters
involved administrative costs, increased uncertainty, and a negative impact
on the reputation of the company to the detriment of its net asset value. The
"cleaning up of the shelves" thus reduced legal costs and risks while
increasing the safety of and return on capital, with a positive effect on
investment.
After this early phase, there had to be a number of improvements in
order to combat anti-competitive practices. First, there was the issuance of
CADE Resolution No. 20 in 1999, which contained a preliminary guide for
dealing with various types of misconduct. 41 Basic information of this kind
was important after decades of price control and no repression of illegal
42
business agreements.
Second, Resolution 20/99 confirmed the interpretation that there was
no infringement per se in the Brazilian legislation.4 3 Both vertical and
horizontal practices must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration not only the costs resulting from the impact, but also the
group of benefits, if any, arising from the event so as to arrive at the net
44
effects on the market and on the consumer.
Third, Law 10.149 of 2000 provided important new instruments for
conduct control.45 It permitted the creation of a leniency program, which
has proven useful for cartel enforcement both in Brazil and other countries.
It also gave powers to SDE to obtain conduct inspections and dawn raids.4 6
The new legal instruments permitted a number of initiatives for
competition authorities. SDE created an antitrust compliance program; a
few leniency agreements were sealed. More importantly, a number of
investigations of cartel activity were conducted. Chart 10 presents CADE
decisions in conduct cases for the 2000-04period.

41 See Annex 1 of CADE's Resolution n. 20, of June 9th, 1999.

42 Supra Sections II & III.
43 See Annex 2 of CADE's Resolution n. 20, of June 9th, 1999.
44 Appendix to CADE's Resolution n. 20, of June 9th, 1999.
4' Lei No. 10.149, de 21 de dezembro de 2000.
46

See Article I of Lei n. 10.149, de 21 de dezembro de 2000.
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CHART 10: CADE DECISIONS IN CONDUCT CASES 2000-200441
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B. Merger Control
Control of the structure of markets by antitrust agencies is common
practice in mature countries and has been gaining increased importance in
emerging economies. The high rates of increase in the number of cases
judged in the 1990's reflects the reorganization of the Brazilian economy as
described in Section III.
The following aspects should be highlighted: 1) low rate of rejection of
transactions submitted to CADE, with a reduced rate of intervention in the
transactions examined; 2) absence of a bias against foreign capital; 3) debureaucratization of the procedures of examination of the proceedings; and
4) development of basic criteria for merger review, including the issuance
of guidelines for horizontal mergers in 1999-2000.
As in most jurisdictions, in Brazil the percentage of cases in which
conditions were imposed was small. Experience with merger review led to
an effort to reduce the bureaucratic burden on the private sector. At the
outset, the majority of approvals were accompanied by performance
undertakings under Article 58 of Law No. 8884. This changed after 1996.
The transaction may now be approved by CADE as long as the transaction
does not have anti-competitive effects. In the period 1994-96, the notion
that approval of transactions would in all cases require a conclusion of
added efficiencies prevailed.
CADE has also indicated that structural remedies are superior relative
to behavioral remedies. Beyond that, starting with Resolution 15 in 1998,
there has been a continuous improvement in implementing a quick review
of simpler transactions.48 There has also been a change in the interpretation
of the annual turnover threshold, which would now be considered with
reference to the Brazilian market, not to the world market.
In line with the available information on strong growth of foreign

47 Source: IDB-OCDE (2005).
48

CADE Resolution No. 15, of Aug. 19, 1998.
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investment in Brazil, there is a prevalence of companies with foreign
capital. A significant proportion of the transactions reflected the local
effects on the Brazilian market of transactions carried out on a worldwide
basis, redefining strategies of international groups. The Brazilian case thus
illustrates the strong structural change in domestic markets caused by
globalization.
As noted above, merger control can consume a considerable amount of
funds, especially immediately after its introduction, when the experience of
the technical staff and private agents involved is limited. Chart 11
summarizes the proceedings involved.
CHART 11: THE PROCEDURE FOR EXAMINING MERGERS

Due to the scarce funds available to antitrust authorities in developing
countries, changes were made in the procedures for analyzing acts of
concentration, making the results faster and clearer and treating simple and
complex cases differently.
The issuance of Resolutions 1/95 and 5/96, and subsequently
Resolution 15/98, were steps in this direction because they: 1) created a
simplified analysis procedure; and 2) integrated and coordinated the
activities of CADE with the organs of government which also have legal
attributions in this area-the SDE of the Justice Ministry and the SEAE of
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the Finance Ministry, respectively.4 9
Article 54 of Law No. 8884 of 1994 called for regulation by the
authority to establish the universe and format of the information to be
provided by economic agents. 50 The aim was to allow an analysis of costs
and benefits for the market that were associated with an act of
concentration. More recently, the so-called summary proceedings, enabled
by Article 16 of CADE's Resolution 12 of 1998, have been applied. 5'
The situation improved with the application of Resolutions 5/96 and
15/98, although further changes were still necessary. 2 Add to these factors
the peculiarity of Law No. 8884 which allows for a posteriorinotification.5 3
That is to say, under the current legislation, the applicants may-and in the
majority of cases do--carry out the act and only after its conclusion submit
it for approval to CADE. The slower the examination by the authority the
more adverse are the effects of this type of action because it allows:
1. any negative effects on competition caused by the transaction to be
made more concrete while the transaction is under analysis;
2. the cost of any divestment to be higher due to the need to undo a
growing group of transactions derived from the original transaction;
and
3. legal uncertainty for the private sector.
However, two recent developments were able to diminish this
problem. The first was the introduction of a "Fast Track Procedure" by SDE
and SEAE for the analysis of acts that clearly have no impact on
competition,54 lowering the amount of time necessary for the judgment of
these cases. The second was CADE's Resolution n. 28, which introduced
two mechanisms to suspend the consummation of the transaction: the

49 CADE's Resolution No. 1, of May 21st, 1992; CADE's Resolution No. 5, of August
28th, 1996; and CADE's Resolution No. 15, of August 19th, 1998.
50 Lei No. 8884, de 11 de maio de 1994.
51CADE's Resolution No. 12, of May 31st, 1998.
52 CADE's

Resolution No. 5, of August 28th, 1996; and CADE's Resolution No. 15, of

August 19th 1998.

53 Lei No. 8884, de 11 de maio de 1994.
54 Such as (1) the purchase of franchisees by their franchisors, (2) cooperative joint
ventures created to enter a new market, (3) corporate restructuring within a single business
group that entails no change in control, (4) acquisition of a Brazilian firm by a foreign firm
that has no (or insignificant) business interests in Brazil, (4) acquisition of a foreign firm that
has no (or insignificant) business interests in Brazil by a Brazilian firm, (6) replacement of
an economic agent where the acquiring firm did not previously participate substantially in
the target market or in vertically-related markets, and (7) acquisition of a firm with a market
share small enough to be unquestionably irrelevant with respect to competition. See
SEAE/SDE Joint Ordinance n. 1, of February, 2003 and IDB-OCDE (2005) for more details.
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"precautionary order" and the "Agreement to Preserve the Reversibility of
the Transaction" (known by the local acronym "APRO"). Both of these
instruments prohibit the merging parties from taking irreversible actions in
order to conclude the merger. The main difference between them is that,
while the "precautionary order" is imposed by CADE (being issued ex
officio or in response to a petition by SEAE, SDE, CADE's Attorney
General, or a third party), the APRO constitutes a consensual agreement
between CADE and the merging parties. Chart 12 presents CADE's
determinations in merger cases.
CHART 12: CADE DETERMINATION IN MERGER CASES 20002004"
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C. Prospects for Competition Policy in Brazil
As with the majority of private sector transactions, analysis of
privatization by CADE also takes place a posteriori. Law No. 8884 applies
after the company has been inscribed in the program, the tender has been
published and the sale has been made; 56 all steps are governed by Law No.
9491/97.57
This format raises doubts, from the point of view of the agent, about
possible objections to the transaction due to anti-competition effects. This
increases legal uncertainty, reducing the expected return from the
investment, and, consequently, the attractiveness and value of the public
assets to be sold.
Naturally, when it is a case of a transaction involving an auction of
companies, the final acquirers are not known in advance, making inefficient
an exclusively a priori analysis by the body responsible for competition
policy. However, it would be desirable for the architecture of the

55 Source: IDB-OCDE (2005).
56Law No. 9491, of September 9th, 1997, repealed Law No. 803, of April 12, 1990, was
a landmark in the acceleration of the privatization program of the Collor administration.
57 Lei No. 9491, de 9 de setembro de 1997.

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

26:619 (2006)

transaction and, especially, the tender bid announcement, to take into
account any concerns on competition effects. This task could be carried out
as early as at the stage of valuation by specialized companies (who are
selected by a tender bidding process).
Currently, the Brazilian Congress is analyzing a project for a law
reforming the country's competition law. The main feature is the reduction
of bureaucracy. Of the previous three bodies--CADE, SEAE, and SDEthere would remain only two: CADE and SEAE. SDE would only regulate
consumer protection. CADE alone would instruct and judge cases, while
SEAE would be in charge of the interaction of competition policy with
regulatory agencies and competition promotion. Chart 13 shows the
evolution of the competition law as if the project was approved.
CHART 13: COMPETITION LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
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Another important instrument foreseen by the project is the possibility
of pre-merger review. Its implementation could in principle reduce
transaction costs. However, if the decision-making process remains
pessimistic the previous analysis would block important economic
outcomes. The project also presents two changes that can increase the
authority's autonomy. First, it would extend the mandate of CADE's
commissioners to four years. Second, these mandates would not be
simultaneous to the president's mandate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Competition policy in Brazil can best be understood as part of a
process of market liberalization. In the United States, competition policy
has become important as a consequence of the evolution of the market
economy. In Brazil, competition policy is an instrument to promote the
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institutions of the market economy. Competition values and culture are
already present in mature economies. In contrast, they must be created and
disseminated in developing economies.
The very existence of antitrust in Brazil was only possible with the
structural reforms of the 1990's (price stabilization, privatization of stateowned companies, and financial and trade opening), since there was no role
for competition policy in an economy with price controls and heavy state
intervention in production. In turn, competition policy is essential in
promoting competitive markets in developing countries and its introduction
is needed in order to face certain issues of privatization and trade
liberalization.
It is not possible to reproduce the typical competition law of a
developed economy in the context of a developing economy. As the
Brazilian experience suggests, there are a number of peculiarities to
developing economies that have to be taken into account.
Finally, although there were several advances in the last ten years, the
institutional building of Brazilian competition policy is far from complete.
There are still important changes to be made in order to guarantee greater
efficiency, fair procedures and autonomy of the antitrust authorities in
Brazil.
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